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Abstract. This article considers commonly posited benefits of nation-states' possessing nuclear weapons.
Two significant international security Issues concern the (1) proliferation of nuclear weapons and
associated personnel and technology and (2) the quest to develop and deploy an anti-ballistic missile
defense primarily against nuclear weapons employment. The first Issue is predicated on the notion that
nuclear weapons proliferation is incompatible with international peace, stability, and security. Yet this
notion is somewhat belied by the permanent members of the United Nations Security Council who are
nuclear weapons powers, and who support--at least publicly--anti-proliferation initiatives, yet seem to
not seriously consider undoing past proliferation by engaging in their own nuclear disarmament. They
may argue that preventing further proliferation is easier than undoing their own proliferation and that
they will get to the latter eventually. However, in the interim, a nuclear weapons apartheid seems to
encourage the have-nots to become the haves.
The second Issue is predicated on the notion that ballistic missile defense will deter certain types of
nuclear weapons attacks. Yet this notion can be countered by asserting that defense planning and
moves to deploy may elicit attacks before the defense is ready, that a defense may re-initiate a nuclear
weapons race with the nuclear haves increasing numbers of missiles and multiple warheads, and that a
defense may elicit nuclear weapons attacks by other than ballistic missile means. In many ways, a
nuclear weapons defense may be said to complicate and work against efforts at nuclear weapons
proliferation and employment.
Finding a way out of a strategic morass on both Issues is difficult because--unlike the basic postulates of
geometry--there is little of any consensual foundation concerning the meaning of nuclear weapons.
What follows is a look at two candidates for consensus.
Can nuclear weapons be said to have independent strategic and ethical value? One might strategically
assert that such weapons buy a nation-state or other political grouping breathing room against an attack
and a means of attack--both to secure political objectives. One might ethically assert that there are
concerns of ends and means that should preclude or support the securing of strategic benefits of
nuclear weapons. However, values--ethical and moral--are part of a political entity's strategic essence.
As a political entity can lose economic viability, territory, lives, and freedom to navigate on the
international stage, it can lose its sense of right and wrong, of ultimate purpose, of identity. The
independence of strategic from ethical concerns is but an abstract construction without concrete basis.
Moreover, an increase in nuclear weapons prowess (as one part of one's strategic strength) can even
lead to a significant decrease in other parts--from economic through ethical.
Do nuclear weapons support strategic deterrence-i.e., prevention of a nuclear war? One answer is that a
state that has such weapons may still use them against another that does not--as the United States (US)
did against Japan in 1945. This may just apply to an ongoing war wherein one side develops such
weapons and the other does not. But deterrence seems at best a one-way proposition.
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A second answer is that a state that has such weapons may threaten to use them for political purposes-including attempting to deter a war threatened by another entity against a third party--against others
that do not have them or have them only in the sense of some significantly inferior status. Historians
suggest that the US did this to the Soviet Union to deter a Soviet incursion into Iran. Assuming the threat
was not a bluff, deterrence again seems at best a one-way proposition.
A third answer is that adversaries who have reached some crude parity as to nuclear weapons will at
least continue their political conflict--but at levels below the threshold of employing nuclear weapons to
destroy the other's people or material infrastructure. This may have been the case during the Cold War,
although nuclear weapons testing continued for much of it, and weapons development continued
through and beyond it. In this case, deterrence may have worked. On the other hand, it should be noted
that nuclear weapons development often obviates one’s own conventional superiority if it has existed--a
caveat that should be considered if one's own nuclear weapons development induces a conventionally
weak adversary to "become nuclear" as well. (Moreover, one could argue that a non-nuclear power
developing conventional superiority over an adversary risks inducing that adversary to "become
nuclear.")
A fourth answer is that knowledge bearing on the validity of deterrence is unknowable. One may argue
that mutual assured destruction, massive retaliation, or parity may have induced a no-nuclear-war
world. On the other hand, supporting the argument with inductive or deductive logic, pure observation,
experimentalism, and/or authority is fraught with epistemological vulnerabilities. Fate, luck, accident,
and the unknowable may be the salient causal factors. Or the knowable may have been pertinent only
to the Cold War without generalization to what has followed and will follow. Or there may not be any
causality to know save for the deterrent value of a world without nuclear weapons.
So. Why such a strong belief in the independence of strategic and ethical aspects on the one hand and
the deterrent aspects of nuclear weapons on the other? Three interrelated answers come to mind. First,
nuclear weapons actually are conceived as a vehicle to seek strategic benefits--economically,
diplomatically, militarily (conventionally)--for a political entity. Divorcing the strategic from the ethical
precludes thorny and uncomfortable problems. However, again, nuclear weapons may actually weaken
pre-existing strategic strengths. Second, nuclear weapons actually are conceived as the acting out of
psychodynamic conflicts of political leaders and garner more support arising from the conflicts of pronuclear citizens. If this is the case, disarmament could be tantamount to mass psychological suicide.
Third, nuclear weapons are intended to be employed and let the chips fall where they may.
That such disparate answers may all have validity in supporting unsupportable contentions underlines a
perspective of nuclear weapons development, deployment, and employment as insanity. What is more
puzzling is what sanity then becomes: containment, rollback, or joining the nuclear club? (See Anderson,
T. (1993). A hard nut to crack: Evolving English metaphors for insanity in social-historical context.
American Imago, 50, 111-130; Beer, F.A. (1984). Controlling nuclear weapons: The evolution of morality,
politics, and science. Journal of Applied Behavioral Science, 20, 323-342; Cioffi-Revilla, C. (1999). Origins
and age of deterrence: Comparative research on Old World and New World systems. Cross-Cultural
Research: The Journal of Comparative Social Science, 33, 239-264; de Rivera, J. (1984). Facing nuclear
weapons. American Behavioral Scientist, 27, 739-756; Kristiansen, C. M., & Matheson, K. (1990). Value
conflict, value justification, and attitudes toward nuclear weapons. Journal of Social Psychology, 130,
665-675; Kull, S. (1986). Mind-sets of defense policy-makers. Psychohistory Review, 14, 21-37; Mack, J.E.
(1986). Nuclear weapons and the dark side of humankind. Political Psychology, 7, 223-233; Mayer, T.F.
(1986). Arms races and war initiation: Some alternatives to the Intriligator-Brito model. Journal of
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Conflict Resolution, 30, 3-28; Roberts, C. F., & Golding, S. L. (1991). The social construction of criminal
responsibility and insanity. Law and Human Behavior, 15, 349-376.)(Keywords: Deterrence, Ethics,
Insanity, Nuclear Weapons, Strategy.)
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